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Abstract 
 The most significant value added by Euro 2012 is undoubtedly the 
infrastructural changes. The event became a catalyst for the execution of more 
than two hundred projects for an amount of ca. PLN 100 billion. This paper 
focuses on the key projects, including above all the road construction projects, 
as well as those connected to road and rail infrastructure. 
Considering such significant outlays, the funding the preparation, 
particularly in a division into private and public sources, becomes an especially 
important issue. It is the predominant commitment of public funds that creates 
the need to justify their allocation, chiefly in the case of the sports venues, 
usually utilised by private sports clubs after the end of the event. Euro 2012 has 
been compared in this respect with other events of this rank, staged in Europe 
since the beginning of the 21st century. 
Introduction 
The most significant value added by Euro 2012 is undoubtedly the 
infrastructural changes. The event became a catalyst for the execution of more 
than two hundred projects for an amount of ca. PLN 100 billion. This paper 
focuses on the key projects, including above all the road construction projects, 
as well as those connected to road and rail infrastructure. 
Considering such significant outlays, the funding the preparation, 
particularly in a division into private and public sources, becomes an especially 
important issue. It is the predominant commitment of public funds that creates 
the need to justify their allocation, chiefly in the case of the sports venues, usually 
utilised by private sports clubs after the end of the event. Euro 2012 has been 
compared in this respect with other events of this rank, staged in Europe since the 
beginning of the 21st century. 
Poland's participation in the organisation of UEFA European Championships 
in 2012 is a pretext to attempt to determine whether the commitment of public 
funds in such major events is justified. The issue of financing mega sports 
events has been the subject of comprehensive analyses presented in foreign 
literature. For obvious reasons, this subject has not yet been taken up in Poland, 
although both Euro 2012 and any potential mega sports events that may be 
organised in future, given the present infrastructure, have contributed to a 
change in this trend.  
 
The model 
 
Table 3.1 contains an overall comparison of the expenses incurred in the 
framework of preparations for UEFA European Championships organised in 
2000–2012. In terms of the structure of financing, two models can be identified: 
public and private. In nearly all countries private funds have been committed, 
with the exception of Poland, where the outlays were financed exclusively from 
public sources. It was in spite of huge hopes placed in public-private partnership 
[Zawadzki, 2010, pp. 606–616].  
The fact of financing from a single source compounds the massive size of the 
outlays. In this respect the event in Poland was among the most expensive ones. 
Its total cost was in excess of 22.5 billion EUR2012.
1
 This is at odds with the 
assumption presented in the subchapter 2.3 that the most expensive events 
necessitate funding from a variety of both public and private sources. For 
comparison, the co-organiser of UEFA Euro 2012 – Ukraine spent less than a 
sixth of that amount on preparations for the event. Among the cheapest were the 
tournaments organised at the turn of the century in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
The overall amount allocated to the preparations in both countries was less than 
half a billion EUR2012. The tournament organised in Austria and Switzerland 
should also be considered cheap. It cost each of the countries around half a billion 
EUR2012. This confirms the hypothesis of lower infrastructure expenditures in 
countries with more developed economies. During UEFA Euro in 2000 and 
2008 the event hosts, being some of the most developed European countries, 
                                           
1 The EUR2012 unit was used to reflect as accurately as possible the expenditures incurred by the 
individual countries [Zawadzki, 2013, pp. 613–615]. 
focused on preparing the stadiums and their immediate surroundings. In Poland, 
Portugal and Ukraine organisation of such a major sporting event became an 
excuse for execution of a series of infrastructural projects related to sports 
venues only to a small extent.  
Table 1. 
Size and structure of financing of UEFA European Championships, broken down into 
public and private sources 
 
Place and time 
Financing 
[EUR2012bn] 
 Participation In funding 
[%] 
public private total public private 
Belgium 2000 0.09 0.103 0.193   47 53 
The Netherlands 2000 0.078 0.202 0.280   28 72 
Portugal 2004 3.4 0.6 4.0   85 15 
Austria 2008 0.4045 0.023 0.4275   95   5 
Switzerland 2008 0.303 0.230 0.533   57 43 
Poland 2012 22.503 0 22.503 100   0 
Ukraine 2012 2.97 0.72 3.69   80 20 
 
Source: [Zawadzki, 2013a, p. 615]. 
 
Although the stadiums were among the most important projects completed in 
Poland as part of Euro 2012, they accounted for a relatively small part of the 
total expenditure on key investments – under 6% (Table 3.2). Non-sports 
infrastructure was of a far greater significance here, above all, road 
infrastructure, which accounted for more than 80% of the outlays. 
Since the execution of a great proportion of infrastructure projects in 
countries with less developed economies is accelerated due to the event but the 
projects would be completed in the future regardless, it is difficult to compare 
the cases of the individual host countries in terms of overall expenditures made 
in connection of UEFA Euro tournaments. As shown in Table 3.1, the scale of 
variance is enormous. The “most expensive” UEFA European Championships in 
Poland ate up more than 116 times funds than the “cheapest” ones in Belgium. 
But to determine the actual scale of financing of an event it would be necessary 
to isolate only the projects executed exclusively for UEFA Euro and disregard 
the ones for which the event was only a catalyst. 
 
Table 2.  
Expenditure on key investments as part of preparations for Euro 2012 in Poland  
 
place 
stadium 
infrastruct
ure 
road 
transport 
rail 
transport 
air  
transport 
public 
transport 
other 
infrastructu
re 
Gdańsk 921.21 1 569.15 0 306.60 0 19 
Poznań 638.58 151.83 0 222.50 0 0 
Warsaw 1 914.63 0 0 0 0 84 
Wrocław 857.42 890.24 0 503.25 760 0 
entire state 0 60 003.80 8 042.70 206.69 0 0 
Total 
million 
PLN 
4 331.84 62 615.03 8 042.70 1 239.04 760 103 
% 5.62 81.22 10.43 1.61 0.99 0.13 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on: Sprawozdanie z realizacji przedsięwzięć Euro 
2012 oraz z wykonanych działań dotyczących realizacji przygotowań Polski do finałowego 
turnieju Mistrzostw Europy w Piłce Nożnej UEFA Euro 2012 (styczeń 2012 – czerwiec 
2012), Ministry of Sport and Tourism, Warsaw 2012 pp.24-42. 
 
Therefore, western specialist literature usually refers to the expenses 
incurred solely with the purpose of preparing the sports venues [Feddersen et al., 
2008]. Opponents of this approach invariably point to the fact that highly 
developed countries usually already have the necessary stadiums and are not 
forced to build them from scratch. Moreover, the construction of an arena 
generally increases the competitiveness of a particular region after the event, so 
the expenses incurred during its creation will be offset by potential income from 
its operation. Despite the aforementioned reservations, such an approach seems 
far more reliable than a comprehensive approach, taking into consideration 
multiple road, rail or air infrastructure projects. As shown in Figure 3.1, 
focusing exclusively on the financing of sports venues greatly reduces the scale 
of financing. The most substantial expenditures, incurred by Ukraine, amount to 
1,093 billion EUR2012. It also reduces the difference between the “most 
expensive” and “cheapest” event. A comparison of the expenses incurred by the 
individual countries as part of the same (co-organisers) and different events 
gives rise to some interesting conclusions.  
The event in Ukraine, although generating the largest expenditures, is not 
regarded as the most expensive in view of the high share (over 40%) of funds 
from private sources for the construction of the Donetsk and Kharkov. These 
venues were prepared efficiently and without any serious disruptions and were 
put in operation as early as in 2009. However, the execution of the stadiums for 
public funds was far from trouble-free. As a result of the increasing costs and 
repeated postponement of completion dates, the Olympic Stadium in Kiev was 
completed in mid-2011, and the venue in Lvov was not ready until November 
2011, following a decisive intervention of the Ukrainian government and public 
prosecutor's office. 
 
 
Figure 1. Scale and structure of financing of sports venues in the framework of UEFA 
Euro in 2000–2012 
Source: Author’s own compilation. 
 
The venues in Poland, wholly financed from public sources, have given rise 
to much controversy and social discontent. Opponents of such a model of 
funding often argue that that the venues are now being used by sports clubs 
owned by private investors. This applies to the stadiums in Gdańsk, Poznań and 
Wrocław. 
It is noteworthy that the outlays made by Poland and Ukraine are far higher 
than those incurred by Portugal despite the relatively similar level of economic  
development and the fact that the Iberian country prepared ten stadiums, 
including six funded from public sources, for an amount of 0,441 billion 
EUR2012 (all ten for 0,8 billion EUR2012). This might indicate a steady increase in 
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the cost of sports venue construction, whose dynamics exceeds the HICP index 
level assumed in the calculations of the EUR2012 unit. 
To sum up the aspect of financing the stadium infrastructure outlays, there is 
a striking contrast between the wealthier countries, allocating relatively modest 
funds to this purpose, usually upgrading existing venues, and the poorer 
countries, not having the required infrastructure base and forced to build sports 
venues from scratch. The issue of the structure of financing is more ambiguous, 
although, with the exception of Austria, it may be ventured that better developed 
countries are more willing to use private sources, whereas public and mixed 
sources dominate in less economically developed countries.  
It would be difficult to judge at this stage whether such a high share of public 
funding was justified in the case of Poland. A matter of great importance will be 
the utilisation of existing infrastructure, including the stadiums which, if 
managed inefficiently, will continue to be a burden to the cities' budgets in the 
future. This issue is described in more detail in chapter four. 
 
Final remarks 
 
In this study, an attempt was made to estimate the impact of the organisation 
of UEFA European Championships on the host cities: Gdańsk, Poznań, Warsaw 
and Wrocław. The adopted list of infrastructural undertakings executed as part 
of Euro 2012 preparations included 219 projects divided according to the 
urgency criterion into key, important and other projects. Analysis of project 
completion revealed that not all tasks had been executed as planned before the 
beginning of the event. Predictably, the key projects were found to have been 
completed in the greatest percentage of the cases (76%), while other projects 
were characterised by the lowest percentage of completion (51%). The degree of 
completion also varied between the individual cities. Gdańsk turned out to be 
the most efficient city with 74% of all projects completed, while Warsaw was at 
the bottom of the ranking with 63% of completed projects.  
Even considering the high percentage of incomplete infrastructural projects, 
it is worth emphasising that Euro 2012 became a catalyst of important changes, 
especially with respect to broadly defined transport infrastructure. It is 
particularly striking in the case of road infrastructure. In 2012 alone 953 
kilometres of expressways were completed. For comparison, by 2011 only 
slightly over 1700 kilometres of such roads had been built. What is important, 
the effects of Euro 2012 will still be noticeable at least until the end of 2014, 
when all projects undertaken in connection with the event will have been 
completed. 
Such considerable infrastructural needs of Poland necessitated massive 
outlays. Euro 2012 proved to be the most expensive of the UEFA European 
Championships organised in the 21st century and, in all likelihood, in the whole 
history of the tournament. A highly disadvantageous fact for our country was the 
complete absence of commitment of private funds in the financing of the 
preparations. The public-private partnership program, in which high hopes had 
been placed in connection with the organisation of Euro 2012, turned out to be a 
total failure. It is noteworthy that it is an unprecedented case of financing a 
sporting event of this type exclusively from public sources. 
The most frequently recognised legacy of the Championships are the 
stadiums. The future management of these venues will have an influence on the 
general cost-benefit ratio of their construction/extension. The difficulties in 
generating sufficient revenues to cover the costs of maintenance and debt 
service are already being experienced. The study indicated some feasible ways 
of fund acquisition involving the organisation of both sporting and non-sporting 
events. 
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